Leveraged Finance
In short
Debt raised against a company's own cash flows in order to buy it — the financing behind private equity, and what decides whether a buyout happens at all.
4 calculators on this page
This deskWhat it does, who is in the room, and how the transactions relate.
The desk at a glance
Leveraged finance raises debt against a company's own cash flows, in order to buy that company. The borrower is usually a business somebody is acquiring; the lender is usually a fund rather than a bank; and the amount is set not by what the business needs but by what its cash flows will support.
That last point is the whole desk. A buyout is priced backwards from the financing: what a financial buyer can pay is what it can borrow, plus the equity it will commit for the return it targets. When lenders retreat by one turn of leverage, bids fall across the market even though not one business has changed. This is why the same asset is worth different amounts in different quarters, and why the answer has nothing to do with the asset.
The desk also carries a risk no other origination desk carries in the same shape: it commits the bank's own money before it has raised anybody else's. A commitment letter binds the bank to fund on agreed terms even if the market moves in between. What happens when it does move is the subject of half the documentation.
Who does what
- The sponsor — the private equity fund. It is the client, it decides the structure, and its return target sets the maximum price. See the fund itself on the other half of the site, and the buyout here.
- The underwriting banks commit to fund and then sell the debt on. The gap between what they committed to and what the market will buy is their exposure.
- The syndication desk sells the loan to funds and other banks. If it does not clear, the terms move within the flex the commitment allows — and beyond that the bank keeps the paper. See the Term Loan B.
- Direct lenders — funds that will commit the whole amount themselves, removing syndication risk entirely. Sponsors pay for that certainty, and in an auction certainty sometimes beats the last few basis points. See unitranche.
- The rating agencies rate the structure for the funds and the collateralised loan obligations that are the organised buyer of this paper.
- The lenders' lawyers write the credit agreement — and what that document permits, years later, is what decides who has power in a restructuring.
What decides whether this desk is busy
Six mechanisms, each with the direction it pushes in and the thing to watch. None of them is a forecast, and none is a number that goes out of date.
| What | Which way it pushes | What to watch |
|---|---|---|
| How much debt the market will lend against cash flow | Sets the buyer's maximum price directly | A buyout is priced backwards from the financing: what a sponsor can pay is what it can borrow plus the equity it will commit for the return it targets. When lenders retreat by a turn of leverage, bids fall even though nothing about the business changed. |
| The gap between what banks underwrite and what investors buy | The underwriting bank carries the difference | A bank commits to fund a buyout before the debt is sold on. If the market moves in between, the bank sells at a loss or holds the paper. That risk is what flex language exists to manage, and it is why commitments are priced with room in them. |
| Covenant terms, not only price | What the borrower may do later is negotiated at the start | Two loans at the same spread are not the same loan. What counts as earnings, how much more debt may be added, and what may be moved out of the lenders' reach decide what happens if things go wrong — and they are agreed while things are going well. |
| The exit that has to exist before the entry | No credible exit, no deal | A financial buyer must be able to describe how it sells later — to a trade buyer, to another sponsor, or to the public market. When listings shut and trade buyers are absent, entry prices fall because the exit is worth less. |
| Holding periods that have run long | Pushes towards selling, refinancing or paying a dividend | Funds have finite lives and investors expect capital back. An asset held past its expected period generates pressure for a transaction of some kind, which is where dividend recapitalisations and continuation vehicles come from. |
| The private credit alternative | Certainty of financing against price | A single lender that will commit the whole amount removes syndication risk and the possibility of a deal collapsing between signing and funding. Sponsors pay for that certainty, and in an auction certainty is sometimes worth more than the last few basis points. |
The calendar this business keeps
Every desk has a rhythm its regulars plan around and a newcomer discovers by being surprised by it.
| When | What happens | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| The auction's second round | Bidders receive the financing structure the seller expects | By this point a bid is a financing plan. A bidder whose lenders have not committed is bidding on hope, and sellers can tell. |
| Signing, with the commitment attached | The debt is committed in writing before it is raised | Commitment letters bind banks to fund even if the market turns, within agreed limits. This is why a buyout can be announced months before its bonds exist. |
| Syndication, weeks after signing | The committed debt is sold to funds and other banks | A deal that does not clear at the expected terms is repriced within the flex the commitment allows. Everything beyond that is the underwriter's problem, and it shows up in that bank's results. |
| The first covenant test after closing | The forecast meets reality on a defined date | Whether a covenant is tested quarterly, tested only when the revolver is drawn, or not tested at all is one of the most consequential things in the document and one of the least discussed. |
| The refinancing, well before maturity | Leveraged debt is refinanced repeatedly, rarely repaid | A capital structure is not paid down to zero; it is rolled. Each roll is an opportunity to change terms, and a market that will not roll it is what converts leverage into restructuring. |
How this desk reaches the rest of the site
The deals and the instruments are one subject. These are the corridors — each one a mechanism, not a resemblance.
| Reaches | How |
|---|---|
| Mergers & Acquisitions Desk | This desk does not originate transactions so much as make somebody else's possible: nearly every sponsor bid in an auction is financed here. |
| Debt Capital Markets Desk | A bridge loan exists to be replaced by a bond, so every large buyout is a future high-yield issue with a date on it. |
| Restructuring Desk | The terms agreed on this desk decide, years later, who has the power in a restructuring and what they can do with it. |
| Credit Derivatives Market | The loans and bonds raised here are the raw material of the leveraged credit market and of the funds that buy it. |
| Alternatives & Private Markets Market | The client is the private-equity fund, and this is where its returns are manufactured — leverage before operations. |
| Structured & Asset Finance Desk | Collateralised loan obligations are the largest organised buyer of the loans this desk sells. |
How the work is actually doneWhat the client pays for, the documents in order, and the arithmetic.
What the client is actually paying for
Three separate things, and confusing them is the commonest error:
- The margin — the ongoing spread over a floating benchmark rate. This is the cost of the money, paid for as long as the debt exists.
- The original issue discount — the loan is sold below its face value, so the lender receives more than the margin implies. It is how a deal is repriced without reopening the margin, and it is where flex usually lands first.
- The arrangement and underwriting fees — paid once, for putting the structure together and for standing behind it.
The economically important term is not any of the three. It is what the document permits: how earnings may be adjusted before leverage is measured, how much further debt may be incurred, whether assets may be moved beyond the lenders' reach, and what a majority of holders may impose on a minority. Two loans at the same margin are not the same loan, and the difference only shows up when things go wrong — by which time it cannot be renegotiated. The playbook reads one in the order that matters.
Which blocker decides across this desk
- Price5 of 9The two sides cannot agree what it is worth.Decides: Bolt-on acquisition, Continuation vehicle, Mezzanine finance, Term Loan B, Unitranche. Matters on 4 more.
- Financing6 of 9The money is not there, or its cost moved under the deal.Decides: Bridge to bond, Dividend recapitalisation, Leveraged buyout, Stapled financing, Term Loan B, Unitranche. Matters on 3 more.
- Approval0 of 9A regulator, a court, a board or a shareholder vote says no.Decides: none of them. Matters on 1 more.
- Diligence0 of 9What was found when the buyer actually looked.Decides: none of them. Matters on 3 more.
- Execution3 of 9Documents, disclosure, timetable, and the people running it.Decides: Continuation vehicle, Mezzanine finance, Stapled financing. Matters on 5 more.
The documents, in the order they appear
- The commitment letter and term sheet — signed at the same time as the acquisition agreement, binding the banks to fund. Includes the flex: how far terms may be moved to get the debt sold.
- The fee letter — separate and usually confidential, because the fees would otherwise be readable off the public documents.
- The credit agreement — the loan itself. Definitions first: what counts as earnings, what counts as debt, what counts as a permitted investment.
- The intercreditor agreement — who is paid first, who may enforce, and what the junior lenders may not do. On a structure with more than one layer this is the document that decides outcomes; see mezzanine.
- The security documents — what is pledged, in which jurisdictions, and whether the pledge survives the borrower's insolvency there.
- The offering memorandum, if the debt goes to the bond market rather than the loan market — see the high-yield issue.
Run the numbers
Interactive: how much debt the earnings carryMedium
Open this calculator on its own page →
Two tests bind a financing — a leverage ceiling and an interest-cover floor — and only the tighter of the two is the answer. Which one binds tells you what the structure is really exposed to.
- Capacity on the leverage test
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- Capacity on the cover test
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- Debt capacity
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- Annual interest
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- Cash after everything
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- Which test binds
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- Reading
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One year, no amortisation, no working-capital swing. A real credit paper does all three, and they usually make the answer smaller. Information and education only. Not advice, not a valuation, and not a quote for anything.
Interactive: where a buyout return actually comes fromMedium
Open this calculator on its own page →
Three sources, separated: the earnings grew, the multiple moved, or the debt was repaid. Most arguments about whether buyouts create value are arguments about which line is largest.
- Equity in
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- Equity out
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- Money multiple
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- Annualised return
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- From earnings growth
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- From the exit multiple
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- From paying debt down
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- Reading
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No fees, no dividends taken out along the way, one entry and one exit. Each source is measured holding the other two at entry, so the three do not sum exactly to the gain. Information and education only. Not advice, not a valuation, and not a quote for anything.
Interactive: sources and uses, with equity as the plugMedium
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The first page of every deal model. The two columns have to be equal, which means the equity cheque is not chosen — it is whatever is left.
- Total uses
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- New debt
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- Cash equity to write
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- Balance
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- Equity share of the funding
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- Spent on the transaction itself
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- Reading
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Rolled equity is a source here because it never leaves. Whether a lender counts it towards the sponsor's contribution is a credit-agreement question, not an arithmetic one. Information and education only. Not advice, not a valuation, and not a quote for anything.
Interactive: the deleveraging pathMedium
Open this calculator on its own page →
Deleveraging is not a plan, it is an output: cash left after interest, capex and tax, swept into the loan, year after year.
- Leverage at the start
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- Leverage at the end
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- Debt remaining
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- Repaid out of cash
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- When it clears 3×
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- Reading
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No working-capital movement, no disposals, no refinancing. Those are the three things that actually change a deleveraging path, and none of them is in here. Information and education only. Not advice, not a valuation, and not a quote for anything.
Go deeper, and practiseLonger pieces, what an interview asks here, and a page to print.
Go deeper
Deep diveThe bid is a financing package with a price attached
A sponsor's offer is not a view about a company that is then funded. It is the largest number the debt will support, minus the return the equity requires, and the order matters.
- Debt capacity sets the ceiling. The calculator on this page shows the two tests that bind — a leverage multiple and an interest cover floor — and which of them binds tells you what the structure is exposed to.
- The equity cheque is a plug, not a decision. Sources and uses must balance, so the sponsor writes whatever the debt and the rolled equity do not cover.
- A rate move repricing debt capacity reprices every bid in the market at once, which is why auction processes stall in the same weeks rather than for company-specific reasons.
- Certainty of funds is a legal state, not a comfort letter. In several takeover regimes a bidder may not announce without it, which is what makes staple financing a seller's tool.
- The underwriting bank carries the gap. Between commitment and syndication it owns the risk that the market moves, and a loan it cannot sell at par is the hung bridge that ends a cycle.
Deep diveCov-lite does not mean no covenants
The phrase describes the loss of one specific thing, and almost every account of it overstates what disappeared.
- What went is the maintenance test. A quarterly ratio the borrower must pass regardless of what it does — that is the tripwire that used to bring lenders to the table before the cash ran out.
- What stayed is the incurrence test. The borrower still cannot take on more debt, pay a dividend or sell an asset without meeting a test at that moment, so the document still governs actions.
- The practical effect is timing. Lenders find out later, and by the time they are at the table the company has usually spent the cushion the earlier conversation would have preserved.
- Springing covenants are the compromise most structures use: one test that only applies if the revolver is drawn beyond a threshold, which protects the bank lender rather than the institutional one.
- The headroom question survives all of it. How far earnings can fall before the first test fails is the number that decides the conversation — see the calculator on the restructuring desk.
Deep diveWhere the risk actually went
The same leveraged loan has been held by three different kinds of owner in three decades, and who holds it changes what happens when the borrower struggles.
- A bank syndicate can be convened. Twenty relationship lenders in a room can agree an amendment in weeks, and each of them values the borrower's other business.
- A CLO cannot. It is a portfolio governed by tests — ratings, diversity, par coverage — so its behaviour in a downgrade is mechanical rather than negotiated.
- A unitranche lender is one telephone number, which is faster to amend and gives the borrower one counterparty with no syndicate to hide behind.
- Marks are less visible the further the loan travels from a syndicate. That is not a criticism of any holder; it is the reason a stressed situation can be less legible than the equivalent bond.
- A dividend recapitalisation is the test of who is really in charge — it returns cash to the owner and leaves the leverage behind, and whether the document permits it was decided years earlier.
Deep diveMilestones: how leverage became an asset class
Every one of these changed either who could lend, or what the lender was allowed to insist on.
- 1980s — the leveraged buyout arrives at scale, funded by a new-issue high-yield market; the 1989 purchase of RJR Nabisco becomes its reference point.
- 1989 — FIRREA forces US thrifts out of high-yield bonds, and a large captive buyer disappears from the market in one step.
- 1990s — the syndicated loan becomes an instrument institutions buy rather than a facility banks hold, and a secondary market appears.
- 1999–2001 — the first European CLOs; the loan gets a permanent, rules-driven owner.
- 2007 — commitments made before the summer cannot be syndicated after it, and hung bridges sit on bank balance sheets for over a year.
- 2013 — US interagency Leveraged Lending Guidance sets supervisory expectations on leverage multiples; a 2017 ruling that it is a rule under the Congressional Review Act effectively withdraws it.
- 2017 — the ECB publishes its own guidance on leveraged transactions for the banks it supervises.
- 2010s onward — direct lending funds take a large share of mid-market financings, and a loan that would once have been syndicated is now held by one manager to maturity.
How a deal dies here
- The debt does not clear and the flex is not enough. The banks fund anyway and hold paper at a loss, which is a deal that completed and a transaction that failed.
- The sponsor cannot reach its return at the price the seller wants, once the financing is priced. It withdraws, and a trade buyer wins the auction.
- Diligence changes the earnings figure the whole structure was sized against. Leverage is a multiple of a number that has just moved.
- The exit stops being credible. No listing window and no trade buyer means no way out in five years, and the entry price falls to reflect it.
- A covenant is tested too early. A structure that cannot survive its own first test after closing is one nobody will lend into.
Test yourself: leveraged finance
Quick questions on this desk — four options each, checked entirely on your device, nothing stored or sent. Wrong answers come with explanations, and the deep dives above hold every one of them. For education only.
What an interview asks here
Leveraged finance questions test one instinct: can you start from what the debt will support rather than from what the business is worth.
Try each one out loud before you open it. What is underneath is the shape of a complete answer, not a script — somebody who can produce those parts in their own words can also answer the four variations that follow, and somebody who has memorised a paragraph can answer one.
Q1How much debt can this company carry?
What it is checking. The core question of the desk, and the answer must name two tests rather than one multiple.
A complete answer contains:
- Two constraints bind: a leverage ceiling, as a multiple of EBITDA, and an interest cover floor.
- Capacity is the smaller of the two, and which one binds tells you what the structure is exposed to — a low-rate high-multiple structure binds on leverage, a high-rate one binds on cover.
- Then check that the business funds itself at that level: EBITDA minus capex, minus cash tax, minus interest, has to be positive.
- Both tests can pass and the company can still fail, because neither of them is about the maturity.
- And the definitions matter more than the numbers — what counts as EBITDA is set in the credit agreement, add-backs included.
Read it properly: Debt capacity · Reading the agreement
Q2Where does a buyout return actually come from?
What it is checking. The question that separates a rehearsed answer from an understood one, because the three sources can be separated arithmetically.
A complete answer contains:
- Earnings growth: the business generates more than it did.
- Multiple expansion: it was bought at one multiple and sold at a higher one. That is the market's doing rather than the sponsor's.
- Debt paydown: cash generated by the company repaid the loan, so the equity is worth more even with everything else unchanged.
- Each can be measured holding the other two at entry, which is how you say which one dominated a given deal.
- The honest observation: when most of the return is multiple expansion, the sponsor was in the right asset class at the right time.
Read it properly: Where the return comes from · Leveraged buyout
Q3Rates rise 200 basis points. What happens to buyout activity?
What it is checking. Whether you can trace a rate move through to a bid price rather than gesturing at sentiment.
A complete answer contains:
- The interest cover test tightens immediately, so debt capacity falls even if the leverage ceiling is unchanged.
- Less debt at the same required equity return means a lower price the sponsor can bid.
- So sponsors drop out of processes against strategic buyers, whose bids are not funded this way.
- Sellers who do not need to sell withdraw, which is why volumes fall rather than prices — the transactions simply do not happen.
- Existing structures are affected differently: floating-rate debt reprices immediately, and a hedge that expires is a cliff on a known date.
Read it properly: Debt capacity · Trade buyer vs. sponsor
Q4What does cov-lite actually mean?
What it is checking. A term everybody uses and most candidates overstate. The precise answer is a differentiator.
A complete answer contains:
- It means no maintenance covenant — no quarterly ratio the borrower must satisfy regardless of what it does.
- Incurrence covenants remain: the borrower still cannot take on debt, pay a dividend or sell an asset without meeting a test at that moment.
- So the document still governs actions; what is lost is the early warning.
- The practical effect is timing — lenders arrive at the table later, by which point the cushion has usually been spent.
- Springing covenants are the common compromise: a single test that applies only if the revolver is drawn past a threshold, which protects the bank rather than the institutional lender.
Read it properly: Term loan B · Covenant headroom
Q5Why does it matter who holds the loan?
What it is checking. A modern question. The instrument is identical and the outcome in a stress is not.
A complete answer contains:
- A bank syndicate can be convened, and each lender values the borrower's other business — an amendment can be agreed in weeks.
- A CLO is a portfolio governed by ratings, diversity and coverage tests, so its behaviour under a downgrade is mechanical rather than negotiated.
- A unitranche lender is one telephone number: fastest to amend, and no syndicate for the borrower to hide behind.
- Marks are less visible the further a loan travels from a syndicate, which makes a stressed situation less legible than the equivalent bond.
- And the amendment provisions have become their own risk — what a majority may change decides what every other term is worth.
Read it properly: CLO issue · Unitranche
Q6Talk me through sources and uses.
What it is checking. A modelling question. The point is that the equity number is an output.
A complete answer contains:
- Uses: the purchase price, any existing debt being refinanced, and fees and expenses.
- Sources: new senior debt, subordinated debt, cash on the target's balance sheet being used, and any equity management rolls over.
- The two columns must be equal, so the sponsor's cash equity is whatever the rest does not cover — it is a plug, not a decision.
- Rolled equity is a source because it never leaves; whether a lender counts it towards the sponsor's contribution is a credit-agreement question.
- A negative plug means the structure returns cash at closing, which lenders will ask about.
Read it properly: Sources and uses · The calculator
Q7What is a dividend recap and who should be uncomfortable about it?
What it is checking. It is a question about incentives, and the answer has to describe the document rather than criticise the sponsor.
A complete answer contains:
- The company borrows more and pays the proceeds to its owner as a dividend. Leverage rises, the owner takes cash out, and the business is unchanged.
- Whether it is permitted was decided years earlier, in the restricted payments basket and the builder basket of the credit agreement.
- Existing lenders are worse off, and if the document allows it they have already consented — which is the whole point of reading the permissions first.
- It is neither a scandal nor free: it raises the leverage that the maturity refinancing will be measured against.
- The instinct it should trigger is to check what other permissions sit next to it, because that basket is rarely the only wide one.
Read it properly: Dividend recap · Reading the agreement
Q8A borrower services its debt comfortably every year and still fails. How?
What it is checking. Whether you distinguish a cash-flow risk from a refinancing risk. Most candidates conflate them.
A complete answer contains:
- Interest cover is a flow test. It says nothing about the year the principal is due.
- A structure can pay its interest for a decade and end the period with nearly all of the principal outstanding — the sweep never gets there.
- Refinancing is a market, not a plan: the borrower is exposed to whether the market is open on a date it does not control.
- Meanwhile capital expenditure is the discretionary line, so the cut compounds against a competitor who is investing.
- That shape took twelve years in the best-documented retail example, and looked fine for eleven of them.
Read it properly: A levered retailer · The deleveraging path
Do these against a clock → — one at a time, ninety seconds each, answer before you look.
Whose questions these are. Every question on this page was written for this publication. None is taken from anybody else’s question bank, and none is a claim about what any named firm asks — that is neither verifiable from here nor ours to assert. They are our own reading of which mechanism a question of this kind is testing. Information and education only.
How the transactions fit together
Everything on this desk is the same arithmetic: a business bought or refinanced with more debt than it carried before, and the debt serviced out of the cash the business itself produces. A leveraged buyout is the complete form of it, and the other transactions are pieces of that structure sold separately. A Term Loan B is the senior layer, written for institutional lenders rather than banks; a unitranche collapses senior and junior into one instrument and one lender, trading price for speed and a single conversation; mezzanine is the layer that sits below both and is paid for taking the first real loss.
Two exist because the timetable of a purchase and the timetable of a bond market do not match. A bridge to bond lends the money now on terms designed to be unattractive to keep, so it is repaid by an issue later; stapled financing is that package prepared by the seller's own adviser and offered to every bidder, which removes a variable from the auction and adds a question about whose interest is being served.
The rest are what happens to a business that is already owned this way. A bolt-on acquisition buys something smaller and funds it inside the existing structure. A dividend recapitalisation borrows again and pays the proceeds to the owner, which returns money without selling anything and leaves the business carrying the debt. A continuation vehicle solves the same problem from the fund's end rather than the company's: the asset moves into a new vehicle, some investors leave and some stay, and the price is set by a transaction the manager is on both sides of.
Concepts to master
- Leverage is a multiple of an adjusted number. Add-backs for exceptional costs and run-rate synergies each may be defensible; together they are the difference between a figure a lender accepts and one it does not.
- Returns come from three places — paying down debt, growing earnings, and selling at a higher multiple than you bought. Only the first two are the buyer's doing. See the buyout model.
- Certainty of funds is a product. In a competitive process, a bid that cannot fail on financing beats a marginally higher one that can.
- Covenant-lite is not covenant-free. It means maintenance tests are absent or apply only to the revolver; the incurrence tests are still there, and they still bind.
- This desk manufactures the raw material of the leveraged credit market — see credit and the loan itself, plus leverage as a mechanism.
Analysis
AnalysisThe analyst's checklist
- What is the entry leverage, and against which earnings measure? Adjusted, run-rate and pro-forma are three different denominators, and the multiple moves with the choice.
- What are the add-backs, and are any of them capped? An uncapped synergy add-back makes the covenant test a forecast.
- How much of the cash flow is left after interest, tax, capital expenditure and working capital? That remainder is the whole of the deleveraging story.
- Is the structure covenant-lite, and what replaces the maintenance test? Nothing is tested quarterly, so the first sign of trouble arrives later and larger.
- What can be moved, and to where? Unrestricted subsidiaries and investment baskets decide whether collateral can leave — see uptiering and drop-downs.
- What has to be true at exit for the equity to work? An LBO analysis makes the assumption explicit rather than leaving it inside a return.
AnalysisRed flags
- An earnings figure that only appears in the marketing materials and reconciles to the audited one through a list of adjustments.
- A recapitalisation priced off the same forecast that justified the original purchase. The forecast has been used twice and tested once.
- Documentation permitting collateral to be moved outside the lenders' reach without their consent.
- A bridge with no visible take-out market at the size it assumes.
- A continuation vehicle whose price rests on the manager's own carrying value rather than on a bid from outside.
Who pays whom, drawn
The timetable on a transaction page says what happens and in what order. These say where the money goes — every payment between the parties, and what each one is for. Only the transactions where the cast list alone does not answer that carry one; each diagram sits on its own page.
- Leveraged buyout — A buyout: who ends up owing the money
- Dividend recapitalisation — A recapitalisation: cash out, leverage behind
- Continuation vehicle — A continuation fund: the manager on both sides
Who does this: Leveraged Finance is a sell-side seat in Investment Banking, alongside Mergers & Acquisitions, Equity Capital Markets, Debt Capital Markets, Restructuring, Structured Finance, Valuation & Deal Analysis. See the industry map.
The Leveraged Finance shelf
Leveraged buyout
A company bought largely with borrowed money, secured on the company itself. The price is worked out backwards from the financing.
Explore →Dividend recapitalisation
A company borrows more and pays the proceeds to its owners. Nothing about the business changes; its balance sheet changes completely.
Explore →Bolt-on acquisition
A portfolio company buying a smaller one. The arithmetic is the point: a low multiple bought into a higher one.
Explore →Term Loan B
The institutional loan that funds most buyouts. The bank commits first and sells afterwards, and the gap is its exposure.
Explore →Unitranche
One lender, one instrument, one signature. The sponsor pays more for a financing that cannot fall apart before funding.
Explore →Bridge to bond
A loan that exists to be replaced. It lets an acquisition be announced with certain funds months before the bond can be sold.
Explore →Continuation vehicle
A fund sells an asset to a new fund it also manages. Existing investors choose cash or staying in — and the manager is on both sides.
Explore →Stapled financing
The seller's own bank offers a pre-arranged financing package to whoever buys — and sits on both sides of the same table.
Explore →Mezzanine finance
Debt between the senior lenders and the equity. Paid last among lenders, first among owners — and the intercreditor agreement is the deal.
Explore →Pages that lean on leveraged finance
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