Valuation & Cost of Capital
Every valuation is a forecast wearing a formula. The formula is the easy part.
One idea, three disguises
- Every valuation is the same statement: an asset is worth the present value of what it pays you. Discounted cash flow says it explicitly; multiples say it in shorthand; comparables say it by pointing at someone else who already said it.
- The disagreement is never about the formula. It is about the cash flows (a forecast) and the discount rate (a judgement about risk).
- The discount rate is where the market's price of risk enters. That is why the cost of capital, not the spreadsheet, is the thing worth understanding.
CAPM: the standard price of equity risk
The Capital Asset Pricing Model prices risk that cannot be diversified away — and only that risk, which is its whole point:
- Diversifiable risk earns nothing. If you can remove a risk for free (see diversification), no one will pay you to carry it. Only the market exposure β is compensated.
- The equity risk premium is not observable. Historical averages run ~4–6% over bonds depending on country and window; forward-looking estimates from dividend yields plus growth are usually lower. Any valuation is a hostage to which one you pick.
- β is estimated, unstable and mean-reverting. Practitioners commonly shrink raw regression betas toward 1 for exactly this reason.
- The model is empirically contested — low-beta stocks have historically outperformed what CAPM predicts, which is the origin of factor investing. It survives as a shared language, not as settled truth.
Interactive: CAPM cost of equity
- Cost of equity
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- Premium over risk-free
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- Implied no-growth multiple
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- Compounded over 5 years
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- Reading
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The "implied no-growth multiple" is 1 ÷ cost of equity — the P/E a company deserves if it never grows and pays everything out. It is the cleanest demonstration of why valuations fall when rates rise: nothing about the business changed, only the denominator.
WACC: blending debt into the rate
A company is financed by both equity and debt, and interest is usually tax-deductible. The blended rate is what projects must beat:
- The tax shield is the reason debt looks cheap, and the reason it is only partly cheap: the deduction is worth τ × interest, and worth nothing to a company with no taxable profit.
- Leverage does not create value by lowering WACC alone. More debt raises the risk of the remaining equity, pushing re up — the Modigliani–Miller insight. What is left is the shield, minus the rising expected cost of distress.
- Use market values, not book values, for E and D. Book equity is an accounting residual; the market's number is the one the market discounts.
- The WACC is a hurdle, not a target. A project earning exactly WACC creates zero value — it has paid its financiers and nothing more.
Interactive: weighted average cost of capital
- Equity weight
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- Debt weight
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- After-tax cost of debt
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- WACC
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- Tax shield contribution
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- Reading
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Feed the result into the NPV & IRR solver as the hurdle rate and the pair becomes a small corporate-finance desk. Note what the model does not do: raise the cost of equity as you add debt. Do that by hand and the "cheap debt" effect shrinks fast.
Multiples: valuation compressed to one number
- Enterprise value is what the whole business costs, independent of how it is financed: market cap + net debt (+ minorities, pensions and other debt-like claims in practice).
- EV/EBITDA compares like with like across capital structures, which P/E cannot. Its weakness: EBITDA ignores the capital expenditure that keeps the assets alive, so it flatters capital-hungry businesses.
- Every multiple is a compressed DCF. A P/E of 20 asserts a set of growth and discount-rate assumptions; the multiple simply refuses to show them.
- Leverage moves equity multiples mechanically. Two identical businesses with different debt loads have the same EV/EBITDA and very different P/Es — and very different fragility.
Interactive: enterprise value bridge & multiples
- Enterprise value
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- EV / EBITDA
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- Equity value / EBITDA
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- Net leverage
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- EBITDA − capex yield on EV
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- Reading
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Raise the debt and cut the market cap by the same amount: EV and EV/EBITDA barely move while the equity multiple collapses. That is the whole argument for using enterprise value when comparing companies — and the whole argument for reading the leverage line before celebrating a cheap-looking P/E. Net leverage above ~4× is where leveraged loan and high-yield markets start pricing real default risk.
Where valuations go wrong
- The terminal value is most of the answer. In a typical DCF, 60–80% of the value sits beyond the forecast horizon, governed by a growth rate assumed forever. Small changes there swamp everything in the modelled years.
- Growth above the discount rate is impossible in perpetuity — the formula divides by (r − g) and returns nonsense, which is the model correctly refusing an incoherent assumption. See the dividend discount model.
- Reverse-engineer instead. Rather than producing a price, take the market's price and solve for the growth it implies — then judge whether that is plausible. This is the single most useful habit in the discipline.
- Comparables import the market's mistakes. Valuing by peer multiple during a bubble reproduces the bubble with a citation.
- Precision is not accuracy. A value to two decimals built on a ten-year forecast is a rounding of a guess. Ranges and sensitivities are the honest output.
The full DCF, and where its weight actually sits
Everything above assembles into one calculation: forecast the cash flows, discount them, and add a terminal value for everything after the forecast ends.
Interactive: discounted cash flow with a terminal value
- PV of forecast years
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- PV of terminal value
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- Enterprise value
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- Terminal share
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- Implied multiple
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- Health warning
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Watch the terminal share. On these defaults most of the value sits beyond year ten, governed by one perpetual growth rate — move it from 2.5% to 3.5% and the answer changes more than a decade of careful forecasting ever could. Push terminal growth up to the discount rate and the model correctly refuses: a company cannot outgrow the cost of capital forever.
Information and education only. All inputs above are illustrative and refer to no real company. Nothing here is a valuation, a target price, a recommendation or advice.