Valuation & Cost of Capital

Every valuation is a forecast wearing a formula. The formula is the easy part.

One idea, three disguises

  • Every valuation is the same statement: an asset is worth the present value of what it pays you. Discounted cash flow says it explicitly; multiples say it in shorthand; comparables say it by pointing at someone else who already said it.
  • The disagreement is never about the formula. It is about the cash flows (a forecast) and the discount rate (a judgement about risk).
  • The discount rate is where the market's price of risk enters. That is why the cost of capital, not the spreadsheet, is the thing worth understanding.

CAPM: the standard price of equity risk

The Capital Asset Pricing Model prices risk that cannot be diversified away — and only that risk, which is its whole point:

$$ E[r] = r_f + \beta \,(E[r_m] - r_f) $$
  • Diversifiable risk earns nothing. If you can remove a risk for free (see diversification), no one will pay you to carry it. Only the market exposure β is compensated.
  • The equity risk premium is not observable. Historical averages run ~4–6% over bonds depending on country and window; forward-looking estimates from dividend yields plus growth are usually lower. Any valuation is a hostage to which one you pick.
  • β is estimated, unstable and mean-reverting. Practitioners commonly shrink raw regression betas toward 1 for exactly this reason.
  • The model is empirically contested — low-beta stocks have historically outperformed what CAPM predicts, which is the origin of factor investing. It survives as a shared language, not as settled truth.

Interactive: CAPM cost of equity

Cost of equity
Premium over risk-free
Implied no-growth multiple
Compounded over 5 years
Reading

The "implied no-growth multiple" is 1 ÷ cost of equity — the P/E a company deserves if it never grows and pays everything out. It is the cleanest demonstration of why valuations fall when rates rise: nothing about the business changed, only the denominator.

WACC: blending debt into the rate

A company is financed by both equity and debt, and interest is usually tax-deductible. The blended rate is what projects must beat:

$$ \text{WACC} = \frac{E}{V}\,r_e + \frac{D}{V}\,r_d\,(1-\tau) $$
  • The tax shield is the reason debt looks cheap, and the reason it is only partly cheap: the deduction is worth τ × interest, and worth nothing to a company with no taxable profit.
  • Leverage does not create value by lowering WACC alone. More debt raises the risk of the remaining equity, pushing re up — the Modigliani–Miller insight. What is left is the shield, minus the rising expected cost of distress.
  • Use market values, not book values, for E and D. Book equity is an accounting residual; the market's number is the one the market discounts.
  • The WACC is a hurdle, not a target. A project earning exactly WACC creates zero value — it has paid its financiers and nothing more.

Interactive: weighted average cost of capital

Equity weight
Debt weight
After-tax cost of debt
WACC
Tax shield contribution
Reading

Feed the result into the NPV & IRR solver as the hurdle rate and the pair becomes a small corporate-finance desk. Note what the model does not do: raise the cost of equity as you add debt. Do that by hand and the "cheap debt" effect shrinks fast.

Multiples: valuation compressed to one number

  • Enterprise value is what the whole business costs, independent of how it is financed: market cap + net debt (+ minorities, pensions and other debt-like claims in practice).
  • EV/EBITDA compares like with like across capital structures, which P/E cannot. Its weakness: EBITDA ignores the capital expenditure that keeps the assets alive, so it flatters capital-hungry businesses.
  • Every multiple is a compressed DCF. A P/E of 20 asserts a set of growth and discount-rate assumptions; the multiple simply refuses to show them.
  • Leverage moves equity multiples mechanically. Two identical businesses with different debt loads have the same EV/EBITDA and very different P/Es — and very different fragility.

Interactive: enterprise value bridge & multiples

Enterprise value
EV / EBITDA
Equity value / EBITDA
Net leverage
EBITDA − capex yield on EV
Reading

Raise the debt and cut the market cap by the same amount: EV and EV/EBITDA barely move while the equity multiple collapses. That is the whole argument for using enterprise value when comparing companies — and the whole argument for reading the leverage line before celebrating a cheap-looking P/E. Net leverage above ~4× is where leveraged loan and high-yield markets start pricing real default risk.

Where valuations go wrong

  • The terminal value is most of the answer. In a typical DCF, 60–80% of the value sits beyond the forecast horizon, governed by a growth rate assumed forever. Small changes there swamp everything in the modelled years.
  • Growth above the discount rate is impossible in perpetuity — the formula divides by (r − g) and returns nonsense, which is the model correctly refusing an incoherent assumption. See the dividend discount model.
  • Reverse-engineer instead. Rather than producing a price, take the market's price and solve for the growth it implies — then judge whether that is plausible. This is the single most useful habit in the discipline.
  • Comparables import the market's mistakes. Valuing by peer multiple during a bubble reproduces the bubble with a citation.
  • Precision is not accuracy. A value to two decimals built on a ten-year forecast is a rounding of a guess. Ranges and sensitivities are the honest output.

The full DCF, and where its weight actually sits

Everything above assembles into one calculation: forecast the cash flows, discount them, and add a terminal value for everything after the forecast ends.

$$ EV = \sum_{t=1}^{n} \frac{FCF_t}{(1+r)^t} \;+\; \frac{FCF_n(1+g_\infty)}{(r - g_\infty)(1+r)^n} $$

Interactive: discounted cash flow with a terminal value

PV of forecast years
PV of terminal value
Enterprise value
Terminal share
Implied multiple
Health warning

Watch the terminal share. On these defaults most of the value sits beyond year ten, governed by one perpetual growth rate — move it from 2.5% to 3.5% and the answer changes more than a decade of careful forecasting ever could. Push terminal growth up to the discount rate and the model correctly refuses: a company cannot outgrow the cost of capital forever.

Information and education only. All inputs above are illustrative and refer to no real company. Nothing here is a valuation, a target price, a recommendation or advice.